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Abstract
Events since Arthur Helton’s death - including the change in leadership of the Palestinian
Authority and the Israeli proposal for disengagement from Gaza make it even timelier to examine
some “practical solutions.” For improving Palestinian lives in the short term, much can be learned
from the approaches taken in other refugee situations. This Article begins with background in-
formation on Palestinian refugees in Gaza. It then discusses Israeli plans for disengagement from
Gaza. In the following section, the Article reviews options for addressing the problems faced by
Palestinian refugees in Gaza, utilizing the broader literature devoted to the integration of refugees
and displaced persons in post-conflict and post-occupation societies. It concludes with an agenda
of action for the international community, Palestinian Authority, and Israel.
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INTRODUCTION
Before his premature death in Baghdad, Arthur Helton
tackled what has been by far the most difficult and long-standing
displacement in recent memory: Palestinian refugees.' He was
determined to put a more generic refugee lens to the situation
of the Palestinians, exploring the options that would be open to
solving the Palestinian problem had the U.N. Convention Relat-
ing to the Status of Refugees been applicable to their situation.
His Essay, "End of Exile: Practical Solutions to the Palestinian
Refugee Question," describes the three durable solutions that
generally apply in refugee situations: repatriation, local integra-
tion, and third country resettlement.2  His aim was to explore
the application of each of these solutions to Palestinian refugees.
U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) resolves that:
[T]he (1948) refugees wishing to return to their homes and
live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do
so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation
should be paid for the property of those choosing not to re-
turn and for loss of or damage to property which, under prin-
ciples of international law or in equity, should be made good
by the Governments or authorities responsible.3
The right of those displaced in the 1967 War was affirmed in
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1. See Gil Loescher, An Idea Lost in the Rubble, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2004, at A23.
For examples of Arthur Helton's work, see, for example, Arthur C. Helton & Dessie P.
Zagorcheva, Globalization, Terror, and the Movements of People, 36 INT'L LAW. 91 (2002);
Arthur C. Helton, The Mandate of U.S. Courts to Protect Aliens and Refugees Under Interna-
tional Human Rights Law, 100 YALE LJ. 2335, 2343 (1991).
2. See Arthur Helton, End of Exile: Practical Solutions to the Palestinian Refugee Ques-
tion, 28 FORDRAM INT'L L.J. 1325 (2005).
3. Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator, G.A. Res. 194 (III), U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., at 11, U.N. Doc. A/RES/194 (III) (1948).
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U.N. Security Council Resolution 237, which called on Israel to
"facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have fled the areas
since the outbreak of hostilities."4 Since then, the international
debate has focused primarily on the question of Palestinian re-
turn to their places of origin.
This Article does not propose to go over that well trodden
ground. Without getting into a discussion here about the "right
of return" or the possibilities of local integration or resettle-
ment, we want to focus our attention on the situation of millions
of Palestinian refugees who currently reside in territory that is
likely to become a Palestinian State in the (hopefully) near fu-
ture. Many are living in extremely difficult situations, with poor
and crowded housing, few economic opportunities, and inade-
quate security.5 With Israeli disengagement from Gaza comes an
opportunity to improve the living situation of these refugees,
before any decisions are made on either the Palestinian State or
the final solution to the refugee problem.
Events since Arthur Helton's death - including the change
in leadership of the Palestinian Authority6 and the Israeli propo-
sal for disengagement from Gaza7 - make it even timelier to
examine some "practical solutions." For improving Palestinian
lives in the short term, much can be learned from the ap-
proaches taken in other refugee situations. This Article begins
with background information on Palestinian refugees in Gaza. It
then discusses Israeli plans for disengagement from Gaza. In the
following section, the Article reviews options for addressing the
problems faced by Palestinian refugees in Gaza, utilizing the
broader literature devoted to the integration of refugees and dis-
placed persons in post-conflict and post-occupation societies. It
concludes with an agenda of action for the international com-
munity, Palestinian Authority, and Israel.
4. S.C. Res. 237, 1, U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1361st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/237
(1967).
5. See Ariel J. Leinwand, The Palestinian Poverty Problem in the Era of Globalization, 9
IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 325, 330 (2001).
6. See Rupert Cornwell, The Middle East: With Arafat's Death, Everything Has Changed,
INDEPENDENT (London), Feb. 8, 2005, at 5.
7. See Harvey Morris, Gaza Strip Settlers Dig in Their Heels as Sharon Beats Retreat, FIN.
TIMES (London), Feb. 21, 2004, at 6.
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I. PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN GAZA
The original Palestinian displacement, having taken place
prior to the adoption of the U.N. Convention in 1951, has been
treated as a special case. The U.N. Relief and Works Administra-
tion ("UNRWA") notes:
Under UNRWA's operational definition, Palestine refugees
are persons whose normal place of residence was Palestine
between June 1946 and May 1948, who lost both their homes
and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli
conflict. UNRWA's services are available to all those living in
its area of operations who meet this definition, who are regis-
tered with the Agency and who need assistance. UNRWA's
definition of a refugee also covers the descendants of persons
who became refugees in 1948. The number of registered Pal-
estine refugees has subsequently grown from 914,000 in 1950
to more than four million in 2002, and continues to rise due
to natural population growth.'
There are currently over 930,000 UNRWA-registered refu-
gees in Gaza, representing two-thirds of the estimated total num-
ber of Palestinians living there.9 Forty-nine percent of these ref-
ugees live in the eight camps located throughout the territory.1 0
These camps range in size from 20,000 to more than 100,000
people. About half of the refugees in Gaza are under the age of
fifteen."
A few statistics will show the dismal quality of life of Pales-
tinians in Gaza on the eve of Israeli withdrawal. Many of these
8. U.N. RELIEF AND WORKS ADMINISTRATION ("UNRWA"), WHO IS A PALESTINIAN
REFUGEE?, available at http://www.un.org/unrwa/refugees/whois.html (last visited Apr.
15, 2005). By contrast, refugees under the mandate of the U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees are defined as persons who are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of
the protection of their home countries because of a "well-founded fear of persecution
based on their race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particu-
lar social group. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 1967, 19
U.S.T. 6223, 189 U.N.T.S. 150. Refugees cease to be refugees if they return to their
home countries or assume the nationality of another country through local integration
or third country resettlement.
9. See U.N. RELIEF AND WORKS ADMINISTRATION, UNRWA IN FIGURES: FIGURES AS OF
30 JUNE 2004 (2004), available at http://www.un.org/unrwa/publications/pdf/uif-
june04.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
10. See id.
11. See Michael R. Fischbach, The West Bank and Gaza: A Population Profile, Popula-
tion Reference Bureau, at http://www.prb.org/Template.cfm?Section=PRB&template
=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=6035 (2002) (last visited
Apr. 15, 2005).
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refugees (both in Gaza and West Bank communities) are highly
dependent on assistance from the international community. As
UNRWA describes, "[i] t is estimated that more than 50% of the
population is out of work - putting 50%-60% of the population
under the poverty line with an income of below [U.S.]$2 a
day."' 12 The U.N. Office for Co-ordination of Humanitarian Af-
fairs reports in its Consolidated Appeal for funding in 2005,
64% of Gazans are poor and around a quarter live in deep
poverty, unable to meet adequately their food needs even
with aid. Health standards have also been falling since 2000:
Palestinians have reduced both the [sic] quality and quantity
of food, public sanitation has been degraded, and the sick are
frequently unable to reach or afford medical care. Growth in
the number of jobs has not been sustained in 2004, and un-
employment is rising again. 13
In September 2002, a U.S. Agency for International Devel-
opment funded study reported, "the prevalence of acute malnu-
trition in the Gaza Strip is considered a humanitarian emer-
gency at 13.3%. "14 A follow-up survey in 2003 found "children
registered as refugees were statistically more likely to be chroni-
cally malnourished (12.4% versus 9.4%, and worse in Gaza Strip
refugee children compared to West Bank refugee children
(13.2% versus 10.6%).""1 A 2004 report by World Food Program
analysts determined that "over a million Palestinians [in Gaza
and the West Bank] are food-insecure, and another 975,000 are
at risk of becoming so." 16
More than 125,000 families in Gaza receive emergency food
aid from the United Nations. The 2004 U.N. World Food Pro-
12. UNRWA Emergency Appeal, available at http://www.un.org/unrwa/emer-
gency/index.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2005)
13. U.N. OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, OCCUPIED PAL.
ESTINIAN TERRITORY 2005, available at http://ochadms.unog.ch/quickplace/cap/main.
nsf/hIndex/CAP_2005_oPt/$FILE/CAP_2005_oPtSCREEN.PDF?OpenElement (last
visited Apr. 15, 2005).
14. ZIAD ABDEEN ET AL., NUTRITIONAL ASSESSMENT OF THE WEST BANK & GAZA STRIP
17 (Sep. 2002), available at http://nutrition.tufts.edu/conferences/childhood/gen
micro/nutritionalassessment.wbg.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
15. CARE INT'L, NUTRITIONAL ASSESSMENT OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP, at 3
(2003), available at http://www.usaid.gov/wbg/reports/FSANSFINAL_O4Oct.pdf (last
visited Apr. 15, 2005).
16. Jean-Luc Siblot et al., Food Security in the Occupied Palestinian Territoiy, Humani-
tarian Practice Network, at 25, available at http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?ID=2673
(Nov. 28, 2004) (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
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gramme assessment "also showed that there is a greater depen-
dence on external aid in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank.
Humanitarian assistance constitutes the major part of the house-
hold food basket in Gaza, whereas in the West Bank employment
and casual labor still constitute the main source of household
income and food."1 7
The deep economic crisis in Palestine is among the worst in
modern history. Between the third quarter of 2000 (before the
al-Aqsa Intifada started) and the fourth quarter of 2004, the un-
employment rate in Gaza rose from 10.0% to 35.2%.1" By De-
cember 2004 roughly half of the Palestinian households lost
more than 50% of their usual income, and about 16.1% of them
"suffered from highly critical living conditions."' 9 Since the be-
ginning of the Intifada, the median monthly wage in Gaza has
declined from 1700 to 1000 Israel New Shekels (worth about
U.S.$390 and U.S$230 respectively as of May 10, 2005) and
77.3% of households were reported to be living below the pov-
erty line.20 These numbers represent an improvement in the sit-
uation since the middle of 2002, but they by no means represent
a recovery.
While separate statistics have not been released for the refu-
gees in Gaza, the fourth quarter 2004 Palestinian Central Bureau
of Statistics survey on economic conditions in Palestinian house-
holds indicates that 54.9% of households visited were provided
assistance by UNRWA. 2 1 If the households visited by the survey
accurately represent the demographic makeup of Gaza, this
number corresponds to over eighty percent of registered refu-
gees. The negative impact on the refugees is not confined to
loss of jobs and income alone though. Since UNRWA and the
Palestinian National Authority ("PNA") have had to redirect
funds to provide food and in-cash assistance, programs to de-
velop and maintain health and education services, and infra-
17. Id.
18. See PALESTINIAN CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS, LABOUR FORCE SURVEY 3 (Oct.-
Dec. 2004), available at http://www.pcbs.org/pressr/labour-q4e.pdf (last visited Apr.
15, 2005).
19. See PALESTINIAN CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS, IMPACT OF THE ISRAELI MEA-
SURES ON THE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF PALESTINIAN HOUSEHOLDS, 11TH ROUND 5
(Oct.-Dec. 2004), available at http://www.pcbs.org/pressr/economic_l le.pdf (last vis-
ited Apr. 15, 2005).
20. See id. at 13.
21. See id.
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structure projects such as sewerage and road maintenance have
not received the financial support necessary. 22 Moreover, mili-
tary incursions into Gaza have repeatedly damaged sewerage,
road systems, electrical grids, water treatment plants, telephone
networks, and other municipal infrastructure in both the camps
and the towns and cities, leaving them irreparable under the cur-
rent funding crisis.23
According to the World Bank, the "economic crisis has been
caused by restrictions on the movement of Palestinian people
and goods, or 'closures,' which the Government of Israel
[ ("GOI")] regards as essential to protecting Israeli citizens from
attacks by militants."24 The regime of closures entails the closing
of borders, widespread curfews, sometimes lasting days at a time,
internal movement restrictions through permanent checkpoints,
roadblocks, flying checkpoints, road gates, earth mounds,
trenches, and boulders and the besiegement of certain towns
and villages by cutting off all access routes to and from them.25
Borders and checkpoints are only open during certain restricted
hours and the need to use alternate routes to avoid roadblocks
delays is both inefficient and expensive for the movement of la-
bor and goods. 2 6 When the movement of goods is permitted
from Gaza to Israel, the "back-to-back" exchange method is used
(offloading goods off one truck, inspecting them, and loading
them back on another truck on the other side of the border),
which drastically increases transport times. 27 The "safe passage"
22. See Palestinian Refugee Agency Still Faces Major Challenges as Situation in Occupied
Territories Worsens, M2 PRESSWIRE, Oct. 31, 2003.
23. See Ken Ellingwood, Refugees Return to Destruction at Camp in Gaza, L.A. TIMES,
May 25, 2004, at A3; see also Javid Hassan & M. Ghazanfar Ali Khan, Palestinian Mission
Launches Donations Campaign, MIDDLE EAST NEWSFILE, May 2, 2002.
24. WORLD BANK, DISENGAGEMENT, THE PALESTINIAN ECONOMY AND THE SETTLE-
MENTS i (2004), available at http://lnwebl8.worldbank.org/mna/mena.nsf/Attach-
ments/Disengagement+Paper/$File/Disengagement+Paper.pdf (last visited Apr. 15,
2005) [hereinafter WORLD BANK, DISENGAGEMENT].
25. See, e.g., Ewen MacAskill, Shelve Israel trade deal, say MPs: Commons group con-
demns damage to Palestinian economy and calls for suspension of EU agreement, GUARDIAN,
Feb. 5, 2004 (mentioning Israel's "curfews, checkpoints and other restrictions - in-
cluding its security wall along the West Bank - for choking the Palestinian economy").
See Letter from Doug Willbanks, Israel's right, NEWSDAY, June 9, 2004, at A38.
26. See, e.g., Ruth Morris, Israel Blockades Gaza Amid Terror Alert, L.A. TIMES, May 13,
2003, at 3; Lee Hockstader, Israel Puts Tanks and Troops in Gaza City, WASH. POST, Feb.
21, 2002, at A17.
27. SeeJames Bennet, 3 Israelis and 2 Palestinians Are Killed in Separate Shootings, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 26, 2003, at A8 (explaining the process of the "back to back" procedure).
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rate between Gaza and the West Bank of Gazan labor to Israel,
Israeli settlements, and Israeli industrial parks ("ISI") has
dropped due to closures from over 15% of the labor force in
1989-1990 to 0.4% in the fourth quarter of 2004.28
II. ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA
In February 2004, Ariel Sharon, the Prime Minister of Israel,
announced his decision to remove 8000-plus settlers and military
personnel and installations from the occupied Palestinian terri-
tory of the Gaza Strip. 29 The Disengagement Plan was passed by
the Knesset on October 26, 2004, and approved by the Israeli
cabinet on February 20, 2005.3o The Disengagement Plan encom-
passes the complete withdrawal of Israeli settlers from the Gaza
Strip and four settlements in northern West Bank. 1 The Israeli
Defense Force ("IDF") is to pull back from all "evacuated" areas,
dismantle all military installations, and redeploy outside these ar-
eas.
32
The seventeen settlements in Gaza to be evacuated occupy
15% to 20% of the land and by the end of 2003 consisted of
1,500 to 2,000 houses." Roughly 32 square kilometers are allo-
cated to agriculture, and 160,000 square meters are occupied by
buildings.34 Neveh Dekalim, a small industrial zone inside the
Katif Settlement Block, comprises 18 enterprises providing em-
ployment for around 200 persons.35 The Palestinians will also
regain control of the Gaza aquifer, the only fresh water source in
Gaza, which has a sustainable yield of roughly ninety-six million
28. PALESTINIAN CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS ("PCBS"), LABOUR FORCE SURVEY
17 (Oct.-Dec. 2004).
29. See PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL, RE-
VISED DISENGAGEMENT PLAN (2004), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Pro
cess/Reference+Documents/Revised+Disengagement+Plan+6-June-2004.htm (last vis-
ited Apr. 15, 2005) [hereinafter REVISED DISENGAGEMENT PLAN].
30. See Nina Gilbert, Knesset Approves Disengagement Plan, JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 27,
2004, at 1; see also Harvey Morris, Israel Agrees Evacuation of Gaza, FIN. TIMES (London),
Feb. 21, 2005, at 9.
31. See Eric Silver, Sharansky Quits Over Gaza Withdrawal, INDEPENDENT (London),
May 3, 2005, at 25.
32. See REVISED DISENGAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 29, §§ 3(i) & 4; see also Arieh
O'Sullivan, This Way Out, JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 1, 2005, at 8; WORLD BANK, DISENGAGE-
MENT, supra note 24, at 23.
33. See WORLD BANK, DISENGAGEMENT, supra note 24, at 14.
34. See id.
35. See id.
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cubic meters per year.36
The IDF will remain in occupation of the Philadelphi Route
inside Gaza, the border area between Gaza and Egypt, and will
continue to control Gazan airspace, coastline, and borders.3 7
Israel is currently negotiating the relocation of the Gaza-Egypt
crossing to the "three borders" area, which would probably
mean the Israeli side, leaving Gaza with no international border
crossings other than with Israel.38 This disengagement is
planned in four stages to be completed by the end of 2005. 3 9
Clause 1.6 of the Revised Disengagement Plan states that "[t] he
completion of the plan will serve to dispel the claims regarding
Israel's responsibility for the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip."4"
This statement seeks to relieve Israel of its legal obligations on
the premise that, once the settlers are removed and the Israeli
Defense Force is withdrawn, Israel is no longer the Occupying
Power under international law. However, as John Dugard, the
U.N. Special Rapporteur to the Palestinian territories, has noted,
Israel's disengagement from Gaza will not end its control over
it.41 As presented in the Revised Disengagement Plan,
Israel will guard and monitor the external land perimeter of
the Gaza Strip, will continue to maintain exclusive authority
in Gaza air space, and will continue to exercise security activ-
ity in the sea off the coast of the Gaza Strip .... Israel will
continue to maintain a military presence along the border be-
tween the Gaza Strip and Egypt (Philadelphia Route)42
Israel will control all labor movement and trade from Gaza
by land, air, or sea, all means of travel to and from foreign coun-
tries, and all aspects of security.4 3 The plan does not allow any
foreign security presence to enter Gaza without Israel's approval
and also reserves the right for military intervention at any time.44
36. See id.
37. See id. at 5; see also REVISED DISENGAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 29, § 3(i).
38. See WORLD BANK, DISENGAGEMENT, supra note 24, at 23, 25.
39. See REviSED DISENGAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 29, § 14.
40. Id. § 1 (vi).
41. See John Dugard, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human
Rights, John Dugard, on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied by
Israel since 1967, U.N. ESCOR, 61st Sess., at 9 19, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/29 (Dec. 7,
2004).
42. REVISED DISENGAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 29, §§ 3(i)(1) & 6.
43. See id. §§ 3(i)(1)-6, 10, 12.
44. See id. §§ 3(i) (3) & 5. Arguably, the disengagement plan does not end Israel's
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A World Bank technical paper has identified several distinct
types of settlement assets: (1) public infrastructure (electricity,
gas, roads, sewerage, telecommunications, water); (2) public
buildings (fire stations, health and community centers, schools);
(3) private houses; (4) productive assets (agricultural businesses,
manufacturing and industrial enterprises); (5) military installa-
tions; and, (6) land.45
What to destroy and what to transfer over have not been
decided, and it depends largely on the judged competency of
the receiving agency. Military installations assuredly will be com-
pletely dismantled, and the GOI has already stated that places of
worship will not be left standing.46 Other structures will be
transferred "to a third, international party that will use them for
the benefit of the Palestinian population."47 The nature of this
"third party" has yet to be determined, but it is certain to work
very closely with the PNA to coordinate this transfer.
Presently, the uses for assets from the settlements have not
been determined. 4' An arrangement for dealing with ownership
claims on land should be decided first. Public infrastructure will
almost certainly be handed over to a governing body, whether
local or national. Greenhouses, agricultural land, industrial
equipment, and other productive assets can be sold, held as pub-
lic assets, or partitioned off. Houses and residential assets, if
they remain, can be disposed of in numerous ways.
In an excerpt taken from the PNA document, "Reintegra-
tion and Development of Evacuated Areas," considering the po-
obligations as an occupying power. The Hague Regulations' definition of occupation
was developed in order to determine when occupation ends. See Ardi Imseis, On the
Fourth Geneva Convention and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 65
(2003). An argument can be made that the legal regime of occupation is not depen-
dent on whether the occupying power exercises effective control over the territory, but
whether it has the ability to exercise such power. See id. at 92-93. Therefore, since Israel
will not only have the ability to exercise such power, but also effectively control Gaza
economically and militarily, Israel will remain the Occupying Power under interna-
tional law. See U.S. v. Wilhelm List, 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINAL BEFORE THE NUREMBERG
MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAw No. 10 1230 (1948).
45. See WORLD BANK, TECHNICAL PAPER IV-SETIrLEMENTS, STAGNATION OR REVIVAL?
ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT AND PALESTINIAN ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 1 (2004).
46. See REVISED DISENGAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 29, §§ 2-4; see also O'Sullivan,
supra note 32.
47. REVISED DISENGAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 29, § 7.
48. See Molly Moore & John Ward Anderson, Israel Has Few Assurances for Gaza Set-
tiers: As Pullout Nears, Relocation Plans Remain Unclear, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 2005, at Al1.
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tential uses for settlement areas, the Palestinian refugees are not
mentioned as specific recipients of these assets.49 The PNA ap-
pears to intend to dispose of settlement assets in a way that com-
plements the Medium Term Development Plan 2005-2007, as devel-
oped by the PNA's Ministry of Planning. °
A. Lessons from Other Refugee Cases
Although not under the protection of the U.N. High Com-
missioner for Refugees ("UNHCR"), Palestinian refugees share
characteristics of other refugee groups. The majority of the
world's refugees are recognized collectively to be ad hoc or prima
facie refugees.5 ' Their refugee credentials are not reviewed indi-
vidually unless they are selected for possible resettlement, nor
are they given the right to settle locally. 2 They remain in a refu-
gee-like status that precludes integration, housed in camps or
49. See PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY, REINTEGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF
EVACUATED AREAS, in Palestinians Consider Uses for Settlements after Disengagement, 15 FOUN-
DATION FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE REPORT ON ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TER-
RITORIES 3 (Jan.-Feb. 2005), available at http://www.fmep.org/reports/2005/Jan-Feb/
vl5nl.pdf.
50. PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY, MEDIUM TERM DEVELOPMENT PLAN 2005-
2007 (2005), available at http://www.mop.gov.ps/en/docs-archive/MoP/MTDP%20
Executive%20Summary%20Final%20031204.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
51. States that have no national legislation setting forth the criteria for recognition
of refugees and that have not acceded to international conventions regarding the rec-
ognition of refugees (like the 1951 U.N. Refugee Convention) generally recognize refu-
gees on an ad hoc basis. See, e.g., Chris Lewa, The Situation of Burmese Refugees in Ban-
gladesh, Regional Conference on the Protection for Refugees from Burma, available at
http://www.forumasia.org/downloads/Arakan/Chiang%20Mai%2OPaper.doc (Nov. 6-
7, 2003) (last visited Apr. 15, 2005). Because the ad hoc refugee has no official status
from the host State's perspective, the refugee is in legal limbo, in contrast to a refugee
who is legally recognized by a host government, as in the case of a person who has been
granted asylum. See id. Some States have enacted legislation or acceded to international
agreements whereby certain groups of people (people arriving from a specific State, for
example) are presumed primafacie to be refugees. See Zachary Lomo et al., Refugee Law
Project Working Paper No. 1: The Phenomenon Of Forced Migration In Uganda: An Overview
Of Policy And Practice In An Historical Context, at 9, available at http://www.refugeelaw
project.org/papers/workingpapers/RLP.WPO1.pdf (June 2001) (last visited Apr. 15,
2005). Generally such refugees, even though recognized by the host State, are not inte-
grated into the host State's society and are in no better a position than ad hoc refugees.
See id.; see alsoJEFF CRISP, CENTER FOR COMPARATIVE IMMIGRATION STUDIES, No SOLUTION
IN SIGHT: THE PROBLEM OF PROTRACTED REFUGEE SITUATIONS IN AFRICA 1 (2002), availa-
ble at http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1010&context=ccis
(Nov.22, 2004).
52. See, e.g., Susan Akram & Terry Rempel, Temporary Protection as an Instrument for
Implementing the Right of Return for Palestinian Refugees, 22 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1, 87 (2004);
Lomo, supra note 51, at 9.
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temporary settlements. 5  Because employment opportunities
are few and their movements outside of their assigned areas are
restricted, they depend on international assistance.
Whether in refugee camps or settlements in poor countries,
or with time-bound permission to remain in developed coun-
tries, prima facie refugees are being sheltered on the assumption
that solutions will be found for them when peace has been re-
stored. There are international legal obligations on host coun-
tries to protect refugees but not to assimilate them.54 Conse-
quently, when wars persist for decades, when refugees remain
fearful of return, and when governments in the countries of ori-
gin will not allow return, refugees and their children find them-
selves with no firm place of residence. In Africa, at least three
million refugees are in protracted refugee situations, often hav-
ing spent more than a decade in refugee camps. 55 This is essen-
tially the situation in which many Palestinian refugees find them-
selves.
There are three internationally recognized "durable solu-
tions" for refugees: firm resettlement offered by a third country,
local integration that occurs when the first refugee haven per-
mits the new arrivals to remain as legal residents and potential
citizens, and repatriation in safety and dignity when the condi-
tions that caused flight presumably have changed. 6
Firm resettlement allows refugees who are temporarily in one
country to be relocated for permanent residence to another,
upon selection by the government in the latter.57 Resettlement
benefits a minority, identified by the resettlement country as per-
sons who have ties to that country, who are at special risk where
they are, or who are seen as desirable immigrants. The UNHCR
refers some refugees for resettlement when they are at risk and
53. See Mark Hetfield, NGO Statement on Resettlement, Presentation to the UNHCR
Global Consultations on International Protection, Geneva, Switzerland (May 22-24,
2002), available at http://www.refugeecouncilusa.org/ngoresetst05_02.html (last visited
Apr. 15, 2005) (arguing for increased resettlement of refugees to complement asylum
process).
54. See Akram & Rempel, supra note 52, at 86-95.
55. See CRISP supra note 51, at 1. The most recent figures are from the end of
2001, available at http://www.unhcr.ch.
56. See id.
57. See JOANNE VAN SELM, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, STUDY OF FEASIBILITY OF
SETTING UP RESETTLEMENT SCHEMES IN EU MEMBER STATES OR AT EU LEVEL (2003).
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in need of protection. 58 The system discriminates against refu-
gees lacking ties to any destination country, and impedes onward
movement by refugees accepted by a resettlement country, even
when there are family or professional ties in a different country.
The option of local integration, in different forms, was once
the most common option for refugees. In Africa and Latin
America, regional agreements and custom supported the prac-
tice of welcoming such persons.5 9 During the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, numerous political exiles settled for as long
as necessary in neighboring countries.60 In more recent times,
large groups forced to flee their countries were allowed to settle
where they chose or, more often, they were settled in camps
where there was sufficient land to farm and to establish a fair
measure of self-sufficiency.6 1 Local integration options, how-
ever, have lost ground due to several factors. In the past two
decades the frequency and size of mass refugee flights, the pro-
tracted nature of refugee emergencies, security concerns, and
the decline in international resources to help sustain the refu-
gees in the country have discouraged governments from welcom-
ing refugees generously.6
2
Repatriation is the durable solution most likely to be availa-
ble to refugees today in large part because it is the only solution
available. This means that refugees often return to places lack-
ing in physical and economic security. Sometimes they return
voluntarily, wishing to re-establish themselves at home or recog-
nizing there are no alternatives.63 At times, return may be co-
erced, with host governments reducing the level of assistance
and protection available in camps.6 4
When the solution to refugee crises depends on local inte-
58. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ("UNHCR") has asked for
resettlement for 78,642 cases in 2004; this does not represent the actual need for reset-
tlement services but rather the number of cases UNHCR can reasonably process given
its limited resources. See VAN SELM, supra note 57, at 17.
59. See CRISP, supra note 51, at 1-2, 21-22.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id. 1-8, 21-22.
64. See, e.g., Congo Expels Refugees Along Burundi Border, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1997, at
A12; UN Refugee Agency to Pull Out Staff CHIC. TRII., Nov. 12, 2004, at 7 (metioning
Sudan's effort to forcibly remove Darfur refugees); Forida Worries About Crime Wave as
Federal Funds for Refugees Ends, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1982, at D18.
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gration or repatriation to countries coming out of conflict or oc-
cupation, attention must be placed on reconstruction as well as
reintegration of the refugees. During the past decade, there has
been progress in resolving some refugee situations while there
have been setbacks resolving others. Two cases in particular,
Central America and Timor Leste, provide lessons for Gaza.
These cases are instructive not because there is a very close polit-
ical or contextual resemblance between either of these and
Gaza-based Palestinians, but rather because they are positive
cases that illustrate a continuing difficulty in the international
community to establish integration packages that encompass re-
lief and development needs over an extended period.
B. Reintegration, Peace, and Reconstruction: Central America
For well over a decade, internal conflicts raged in El Salva-
dor, Guatemala, and Nicaragua.65 During the 1980s, these be-
came proxy wars rooted in east-west ideological competition,
and defied efforts on the part of regional leaders to achieve
peaceful resolution of the conflicts.6 6 Only at the close of the
decade and the end of the Cold War was it finally possible to
achieve both regional and international consensus in support of
a peace process in this ideologically divided area.67 The govern-
ments in the region collectively sought and obtained interna-
tional agreement for tying their compliance with peace arrange-
ments to assurances of outside humanitarian aid and develop-
ment assistance." The result was a comprehensive plan for
regional reconstruction, the CIREFCA69 Plan of Action of
1989.70 The CIREFCA Plan was specifically intended to find du-
rable solutions to the problems of uprootedness within the
framework of national development and as an integral part of
65. See, e.g., Juan J. Walte, Refugees Flee Civil Strife, Bad Economies At Home, USA To-
DAY, Mar. 10, 1989, at 6A; Akram & Rempel, supra note 52, at 106-07.
66. See Tim Golden, After the Cold War: Views From Latin America Sweeping Political
Changes Leave Latin Poor Still Poor, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1992, at 1.
67. See Akram & Rempel, supra note 52, at 106-07.
68. See id.
69. The name CIREFCA is derived from "International Conference on Refugees of
Central America," the conference where the plan was created.
70. Declaration and Concerted Plan of Action in Favour of Central American Refugees,
Returnees and Displaced,U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Annex 1, Agenda Item 110(b), at 19,
U.N. Doc. A/44/527 (1989) [hereinafter CTREFCA Plan of Action].
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efforts toward democracy and peace. 71 To this end it targeted
1.8 million uprooted people throughout the region. 2 All the
governments in the region participated in CIREFCA and bene-
fited from projects whether or not the wars had been fought on
their territories, because the displacement and violence gener-
ated by the fighting had affected them all.
Through CIREFCA, the major donors in Europe, Japan,
and North America worked with several U.N. agencies, the gov-
ernments of the six CIREFCA member countries, and non-gov-
ernmental organizations in each country to channel humanita-
rian assistance funds to the diverse populations uprooted by
war. 73 Beyond serving as a channel for humanitarian assistance,
CIREFCA was designed as a forum of reconciliation and cooper-
ation among national leaders, between and among opposing
groups, between former refugees and governments, and be-
tween governments and non-government organizations."
To bring about durable solutions, the process aimed to link
the relief projects needed for immediate survival with longer-
term economic revitalization, capacity building, and rebuilding.
The signature assistance mode of CIREFCA was the "quick im-
pact project," or "QIP." QIPs are short term, one time, donor
infusions to enable local groups to collectively select and imple-
ment needed economic and social infrastructure projects or pro-
ductive enterprises. 75 Donors in Central America found QIPs to
be very attractive since they seemed to promote community de-
velopment without requiring long term donor involvement. The
results of thousands of these small-scale projects, however, were
mixed, and often disappointing. 76
71. See UNHCR, Review of the CIREFCA Process, May 1, 1994, 1, available at
http://www.unhcr.ch.
72. CIREFCA Plan of Action, supra note 70, at § 11.8.
73. See Patricia Weiss Fagen, Peace in Central America: Transition for the Uprooted, in
WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 30-39 (1993).
74. See id.
75. See UNHCR, Quick Impact Projects (QiPs): A Provisional Guide (May 1,
2004), available at http://www.unhcr.ch; see also Susan Martin et al., Temporary Protection:
Towards a New Regional and Domestic Framework, 12 GEo. IMMIG. L.J. 543, 565 (1998).
Recommended strategies for QIPs in and beyond CIREFCA are outlined in UNHCR,
Assistance Policies and Strategies for the Promotion of Durable Solutions: Achieving Sustainable
Reintegration, U.N. Doc. EC/1995/SC2/CRP.4 (Jan. 22, 1995), available at http://www.
unhcr.ch.
76. See LAN SMILLIE, RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT: THE STRUGGLE FOR SYNERGY ch. 1
(1998).
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While these initiatives did serve to promote dialogue, recon-
ciliation, and short-term economic improvements throughout
the region, they did not often link with or lead to wider develop-
ment efforts. Hence, once the actions were completed - if they
were completed - there was no assured follow-on, and the re-
sults were rarely sustainable.77 The CIREFCA model provided a
framework for addressing displacement comprehensively. How-
ever, CIREFCA neither solved nor significantly alleviated the
pervasive poverty and inequality in Central America, nor did it
resolve serious flaws in governance in the affected countries.
The long-term benefits of the process lay in contributing mean-
ingfully to lasting peace in the region and promoting a broadly
based, enduring, and serious discussion about social and eco-
nomic change in the region.78
C. Nation Building After War: Timor Leste 1999-2002
Timor Leste is the most dramatic example of a durable solu-
tion following a tragic series of events. Having voted for inde-
pendence from Indonesia in 1999, the entire population came
under attack by irregular Indonesian and pro-Indonesian
forces.79 The already poor territory was devastated and an esti-
mated two-thirds (over 500,000 people) of the 750,000 popula-
tion were driven from their homes; about half the people (ap-
proximately 240,000) who fled from the violence of 1999 crossed
into West Timor as refugees.80 They consisted of those escaping
life-threatening reprisals and destruction, and others who, it is
likely, had facilitated the violence in some way. l When East Ti-
mor (now Timor Leste) achieved independence and the U.N.
mission oversaw the creation of a new State in May 2002, the
refugees along with those who had fled to remote internal loca-
77. See Jeff Crisp, Mind the Gap! UNHCI, Humanitarian Assistance and the Develop-
ment Process, J. OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, (Nov. 2001), available at http://www.jha.
ac/articles/u043.htm (Nov. 21, 2004) (last visited Apr. 15, 2005) (citing UNHCR ac-
knowledgement to this effect).
78. For an early critical assessment of CIREFCA, see ALDOLFO AGUILAR ZINSER, GE-
ORGETOWN UNIVERSrIY HEMISPHERIC MIGRATION PROJECT, CIREFCA: THE PROMISES AND
REALITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES ON CENTRAL AMERICAN REFUGEES (1991).
79. See In Timor, Separatists Attacked By Militias, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1999, at 4.
80. See Kathy Marks, Trapped By Fear: The Forgotten Refugees Of East Timor, INDEPEN-
DENT (London), June 14, 2004, at 27.
81. See Philip Sherwell, Widows' Grief Overshadows East Timor Independence, SUNDAY
TELEGRAPH (London), May 19, 2002, at 28.
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tions were able to return as full citizens of their own country.
Nearly all the refugees returned.8 2
The U.N. Transitional Administration for East Timor ("UN-
TAET") oversaw both the rebuilding of the country and the crea-
tion of what would be the national institutions of government
between October 1999 and May 2002.8" The U.N. approach in
Timor Leste was to move gradually toward handing over admin-
istrative responsibilities to national and local authorities. 84 Elec-
tions were scheduled late in the process and, in the interim, ef-
forts were made to enhance local capacities in all areas of gov-
ernance.
8 5
Under U.N. oversight and presently with its own govern-
ment, Timor Leste has made admirable progress politically and
economically. 86 Nevertheless, it will long remain a war-torn
country with a fragile economy in need of assistance. Critics of
the U.N. process - which all agree was fundamentally well-con-
ceived and executed - also have called attention to an overly
accelerated movement from humanitarian relief to development
assistance.8 7 Rather than a planned transition that maintained
assistance for basic needs (shelter, help for vulnerable sectors,
health care) as required - for example, as people gradually re-
turned from West Timor - the donors and UNTAET replaced
emergency aid in favor of efforts to prepare the country for self-
government in accordance with UNTAET's mandate. 8 As of
82. See Marks, supra note 80. Return was not automatic, however. The presence
and power of the militia groups in West Timor first prevented refugees from returning
for a considerable period, then proved decisive in facilitating; second, the militia mem-
bers not only were able to return with the refugees, but negotiated an amnesty from
prosecution for war crimes they may have perpetrated. Consequently, former militia
groups effectively controlled many villages. Other members of the militias remained in
West Timor with their families and they are unlikely either to return or to face sanc-
tions of any kind. See Sherwell, supra note 81.
83. Yusril: Untaet Should Not Delay Setting Up Govt In E. Timor, ANTARA (Indonesia),
Sept. 10, 2000.
84. See U.N., East Timor - UNTAET Background Chronology, at http://www.un.
org/peace/etimor/Untaetchrono.html (last visited May 17, 2005).
85. See U.N., East Timor - UNTAET Mandate, at http://www.un.org/peace/
etimor/UntaetM.htm (last visited May 17, 2005).
86. See UN. Success Story; East Timor Comes Back From The Brink SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRm., May 21, 2002, at B8.
87. See IAN SMILLIE & LARRY MINEAR, HUMANITARIAN FINANCING: DONOR BEHAVIOR;
SOME PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS FOR THE MoNTREux RETREAT 15 (2003), available at
http://hwproject.tufts.edu/pec/pdf/montreux.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
88. See East Timor - UNTAET Mandate, supra note 85.
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March 2001, the emergency funding that had been obtained
from the Consolidated Appeal Process ("CAP"), was exhausted. 9
The initial CAP had successfully mobilized generous amounts of
emergency funding, but with short time frames for execution.
Given the dire conditions in Timor Leste and the continuing
return of people to their homes, there remained serious need
for international relief in various forms thereafter.° °
This pattern of ample but short-term emergency aid that
prematurely ends is all too common in post-conflict rebuilding.
What makes the repetition of the pattern particularly trouble-
some in the case of Timor Leste is that in so many ways, the
rebuilding process was exemplary in its adoption of lessons
gleaned from other experiences.
The hand-over from U.N. supervision to a new Timor Leste
government in May 200291 was a satisfying conclusion to a long
struggle against the 1975 forced annexation of the territory.
Nevertheless, the newly independent Nation's future prospects
are still tenuous due to the previous neglect under Indonesian
rule, the scars of the destruction produced by the Indonesian
militia in 1999, and the inexperience of much of the new leader-
ship. As affirmed by Christopher McDowell, in his 2003 case
study of Timor Leste, the country will require the security pro-
vided by an international military presence, as well as financial
aid for some years to preserve the gains achieved and permit it to
progress.9 2 In February 2005, U.N. Secretary General Kofi An-
nan recommended extending the U.N. peacekeeping mission in
Timor Leste for yet another year.93
89. See East Timor: U.N. Mission Chief Calls For Funds In Final Stretch Before Indepen-
dence, June 14, 2001, available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/; Rebuilding a city which
was burned and trashed, IRISH TIMES, Sept. 2, 2000, at 11. (stating "[t]he international
community's promise to rebuild East Timor has been long on promise... but short on
money").
90. See Christopher McDowell, Displacement, Return and Justice in the Creation of Ti-
mor Leste, in CATCHING FIRE (forthcoming).
91. See East Timor - UNTAET Background Chronology, supra note 84; see also
East Timor Celebrates, FIN. TIMES (London), May 20, 2002, at 34.
92. See generally CHRISTOPHER McDOWELL, DISPLACEMENT, RETURN AND JUSTICE
(2003).
93. See U.N. "Must Extend East Timor Stay", BBC NEws, Feb. 24, 2005, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4293131stm.
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III. OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE FUTURE IN GAZA
Israeli disengagement could immediately affect Palestinian
refugees, and indeed all Palestinians, in Gaza in several ways. A
best-case scenario would have the following components: Firstly,
it will remove all internal movement restrictions, allowing the
transport of goods to occur unimpeded within the territory.
This should decrease transportation costs, thus lowering the cost
of goods. Secondly, incomes should rise with the end of cur-
tailed work hours due to curfews and travel restrictions. Thirdly,
the extra financial capital will create more demand for goods,
thus creating more employment. Fourthly, with households able
to support more of their needs themselves, UNRWA, the PNA,
and other providers of civil and social services will be able to
concentrate more funding on communications, education,
health, infrastructure, and sanitation.
However, as the World Bank report, Disengagement, the Pales-
tinian Economy and the Settlements, points out, the conclusion of
internal closures will likely not be enough to pull the economy
out of the recession; 4 without a major reform of the closure re-
gime, however, the Palestinian economy will not revive and
Israel's security gains may not be sustainable. By itself, Israel's
Disengagement Plan will have very little impact on the Palestin-
ian economy and Palestinian livelihoods, since it proposes only a
limited easing of closures. A focus on the over-arching issue is
essential if disengagement is to deliver long-term benefits. In-
deed, were it accompanied by the sealing of Gaza's borders to
labor and trade or by terminating supplies of water and electric-
ity to Gaza, disengagement would create worse hardships than
are seen today.95
The dangers posed by the disengagement are obviously sig-
nificant. For most of the post-1967 period, the Palestinian trade
deficit amounted to twenty-five to thirty percent of the Gross Do-
mestic Product,9 6 indicating a severe trade imbalance in a period
when borders were far more open. The Oslo plan for Palestin-
ian economic development relied on four connected processes:
(1) ensuring international aid to stimulate investment in public
94. See WORLD BANK, DISENGAGEMENT, supra note 24, at i.
95. See id.
96. See WORLD BANK, DEVELOPING THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: AN INVESTMENT IN
PEACE tbl. 32 (1993).
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infrastructure; (2) development of close relations with Israel to
facilitate access to Israel's markets and trade infrastructure; (3)
accessing foreign markets beyond Israel; and (4) attracting sig-
nificant foreign investment to contribute to the growth of the
Palestinian private sector. Should the disengagement involve
the sealing of Gaza's borders, all four processes would be se-
verely curtailed.
The general economic well-being of the Palestinian refu-
gees in Gaza depends most upon border control with Israel and
their access to international markets. Until the outbreak of the
intifada, ISI labor markets provided employment for over fifteen
percent of the Gazan labor force at higher wages than local
jobs.98 This has fallen to 0.4% and once disengagement is ac-
complished, the settlements will no longer be a source of em-
ployment.99 In the short term, access to the Israeli labor markets
will be a key ingredient in resolving the economic crisis in Gaza.
A World Bank study has made important suggestions for practi-
cal solutions that would satisfy Israel's security concerns and, at
the same time, ease restrictive measures on movement.100 These
include the use of sniffer technology for explosives, imaging sys-
tems for inspecting loads, tamper-proof seals, weapons detectors,
and document recognition technology. 101 In the longer term,
the reestablishment of a Gaza-West Bank passage and interna-
tional air and sea gateways in Gaza are necessary to encourage
private investment in the territory."' Palestinian refugees will
reap the benefits and share the hazards of all residents of Gaza
during this transition period.
The lesson of countries in political transitions is that the
transition for refugees to a stable, secure future is neither easy
nor quick. Gaza is unlikely to transform its economy any more
quickly than the Central American countries, Timor Leste, or
97. See generally David P. Fidler & Fadi G. Harb, Palestinian Economic Development in
the Era of Globalization, in PALESTINE AND INTERNATIONAL LAw: ESSAYS ON POLITICS AND
ECONOMICS (Sanford R. Silverburg ed., 2002).
98. See WORLD BANK, FOUR YEARS - INTIFADA, CLOSURES AND PALESTINIAN Eco-
NOMIC CRISIS: AN ASSESSMENT 3 (2004).
99. See id. at 2 fig. 1.2.
100. See World Bank, Technical Paper I - Borders and Trade Logistics, in STAGNATION
OR REVIVAL? ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT AND PALESTINIAN ECONOMIC PROSPECTS (Dec. 1,
2004).
101. See id. at 5-6.
102. See id. at 9-12.
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any number of other countries that have emerged from conflict
in the past two decades. As in these other cases, the interna-
tional community can play an essential role in facilitating recon-
struction, heeding the lessons of previous transitions.
First, donors should continue to provide generous humani-
tarian relief while paving the way for economic development.
The residents of Gaza, and particularly the refugees, will likely
continue to need food aid, shelter, and healthcare for some time
after disengagement. As the Timor Leste case shows, premature
end to relief can be devastating for households who do not yet
have access to solid livelihoods. On the other hand, delayed de-
velopment consigns too many refugees to a life in limbo.
Unfortunately, virtually all long-range programs that could
link humanitarian and development assistance are underfunded.
Although there have been initiatives within governments and the
financial institutions to facilitate technical assistance and fund-
ing for post-emergency countries still in transition, the programs
are still too small to have meaningful impacts. Donors were not
receptive in 2000 to a promising proposal from UNHCR, the
World Bank, and the U.N. Development Program ("UNDP") for
commonly formulated and agreed operational responses to span
relief to development transitions. 103 The proposal was largely
abandoned. Subsequently, UNHCR has established a framework
for Durable Solutions that brings together issues related to de-
velopment assistance to refugees, a "4 Rs" approach to repatria-
tion, reintegration, rehabilitation, and reconstruction, and de-
velopment through local integration." 4 A September 2003 doc-
ument explaining the framework10 5 underscores the need for
comprehensive planning with partners representing develop-
ment agencies. The "4 Rs" are an integrated approach with
other international organizations and agencies for joint imple-
mentation and resource mobilization strategies. In this model,
UNHCR (or in this case, UNRWA) would focus on its traditional
strengths, but would engage with a range of humanitarian and
development partners and donors from the outset to strengthen
103. See Crisp, supra note 77.
104. See UNHCR, Framework for Durable Solutions for Refugees and Persons of Concern,
U.N. Doc. EC/53/SC/INF.3 (2003).
105. See id.
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burden-sharing, development, and capacity-building compo-
nents for refugees and other similarly affected populations.
This is a positive and sensible approach. However, whether
the long-term international resources needed to support it will
be forthcoming is a decision for the international community
and, particularly, the major donors. The strong World Bank in-
volvement in Gaza and the West Bank now is encouraging.
The major reason for inadequate international resources
and commitments seems to be that when emergencies occur, do-
nor governments neither anticipate nor plan for long-term mul-
tifaceted forms of involvement. It is well understood that inter-
national funding alone is insufficient to induce meaningful po-
litical, economic, and social reforms or to assure that people
who have been uprooted can remake their lives safely and pro-
ductively. Likewise, aid professionals know that a large and long-
standing international presence is almost sure to stifle local initi-
ative. Nevertheless, there are all too many indications that gov-
ernments will opt for too little funding and will continue to insist
on timeframes too short to fulfill stated objectives. Progress in-
evitably occurs more slowly in some sectors than in others. The
argument for multi-agency integrated planning and transition
strategies and for "staying the course" is that realities on the
ground - not prefabricated projects and previously established
timeframes - should determine the nature of international in-
terventions and the funding needed for these interventions.
Second, as part of a reconstruction strategy, governance will
need sustained attention. Donors historically have not been as
forthcoming with resources for this purpose as for quick-yield
projects."' However, attitudes internationally appear to be
changing with greater recognition that security and sustainable
development depend on well-functioning transparent govern-
ment structures."°7 Donors are very much aware that the success
of internationally backed programs in Palestine can fail if the
well-known problems of corruption, personalism, and lack of
democratic procedures are not corrected. In the World Bank
and regional financial institutions, and in the United Nations,
106. See David P. Fidler, Foreign Private Investment in Palestine: An Analysis of the Law
on the Encouragement of Investment in Palestine, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 529, 541-44, 550
(1995).
107. See Steven Weisman, Donors Consider Large Rise in Aid to Palestinians, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 17, 2004, at Al.
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good governance support and training are being systematically
incorporated into many aid programs. The World Bank Insti-
tute has an Anti-Corruption Unit that incorporates capacity
building and good governance training."' 8 The UNDP portrays
its Capacity Development Program as a process that "entails the
sustainable creation, utilization and retention of ... capacity, in
order to reduce poverty, enhance self-reliance, and improve peo-
ple's lives."1"9
Third, long-term stability requires an end to violence. The
root causes of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict are much debated
and, while it is not the purpose of this Essay to review the various
arguments, it is fair to say that leadership from elected officials
in both Palestine and Israel will be essential to any efforts to curb
longstanding tensions. Here too, the international community
can play an important role in facilitating peace and security for
all parties. Measures such as preventive diplomacy, preventive
deployment, early warning systems, small arms control, norms
creation, and the establishment of credible deterrents can be ef-
fective conflict prevention tools.
CONCLUSION
Israeli disengagement from Gaza provides both opportuni-
ties and challenges to improve the situation of refugees who are
now living in intolerable circumstances. The success or failure
of disengagement will be measured not only by its role in the
peace process but also by its impact on the lives of the people of
Gaza. Given the high proportion of the Gazan population who
are refugees, they will be the true test of disengagement. Arthur
Helton was correct in pointing out that Palestinian refugees
share many things in common with other refugees. This Article
has sought to draw the lessons of other transitions from conflict
to peace to identify ways that the international community can
help ensure a successful end to disengagement.
108. See WORLD BANK, REFORMING PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS AND STRENGTHENING GOV-
ERNANCE: A WORLD BANK STRATEGY, IMPLEMENTATION UPDATE 29 (April 2002).
109. United Nations Development Program ("UNDP"), Capacity Development, at
http://www.capacity.undp.org (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
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